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Entrepreneurial Opportunities For All? 
Entrepreneurial Capability and the Capabilities Approach 
Abstract 
This paper considers the freedom of each and every one of us to choose whether to pursue 
entrepreneurial opportunities i.e., practice entrepreneurship, should we wish to do so.  Draw-
ing on the Capabilities Approach, a novel conceptualisation of entrepreneurial capability is 
put forward as the individual freedom to pursue an entrepreneurial opportunity within one’s 
environment. In shifting analytical attention away from empirical cases of entrepreneurs i.e. 
those identified post hoc with successfully pursuing an entrepreneurial opportunity, and ex-
ploring the potential (or not) of any individual to pursue entrepreneurship in theory, we are 
forced to ask what is specific about entrepreneurial opportunities and whether or not they can 
be pursued by anyone? Our resulting conception of entrepreneurial capability introduces 7 
universal and necessary conditions for this distinctive type of freedom to be present. The sig-
nificance of this conceptualisation of entrepreneurial capability for entrepreneurship theory 
and economic and human development policy are discussed. 
Keywords: capabilities approach, entrepreneurial capability, freedom, opportunity theory, 
human development.  
Introduction 
Much empirical work into entrepreneurial capabilities tends to measure and understand out-
comes (e.g. Verrest, 2013). That is to say those being studied tend to already be engaged with 
entrepreneurship in some way. The implicit assumption in this type of research is that these 
individuals had the necessary freedoms to choose whether to pursue or develop their per-
ceived entrepreneurial opportunity. In this paper we build on the growing body of research 
that emphasises the need to ask how many members of society do not have such freedoms. 
Whilst important contributions have been made to our understanding of this question (see 
Verdujin et al., 2014), particularly where issues of race, gender and disadvantage can restrict 
opportunities for particular social groups (e.g. Blackburn and Ram 2006; Carter and Rosa, 
1998; Jones et al., 2012; Marlow and Patton, 2005; Ram and Jones, 1998; Ram et al., 2008; 
Smith and Air, 2012), the specific conditions under which an individual might have the nec-
essary freedoms to undertake entrepreneurial action are yet to be made clear. This work ad-
dresses this issue.  
There are a number of conceptual hurdles to specifying the freedoms required for pur-
suing entrepreneurial opportunities. At the broadest level, there is a need to account for what 
distinguishes entrepreneurship from other activities, and, therefore, entrepreneurial opportu-
nities from opportunities in general. As the discourse of entrepreneurship has become increas-
ingly popular in recent years, so more activities, interests, and applied contexts have the ad-
verb ‘entrepreneurial’ attached to them. Indeed, there appears to be a growing gulf between 
the traditional functionalist economics perspective on the one hand, which sees entrepreneur-
ship as part of the explanation of capitalistic profit-seeking behaviour, and the interpretivist 
perspective on the other, which is grounded in a socially constructed entrepreneurial subjec-
tivity and the application of entrepreneurial behaviours in ever more specific contexts - green, 
social, institutional, educational and cultural entrepreneurship. Yet, entrepreneurship theory 
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rarely suggests that entrepreneurship requires any specific antecedent conditions to be met in 
order for it to take place. 
Theorising when entrepreneurial opportunity seeking behaviours might actually be pos-
sible, and when they are not for any given individual, has received little attention. In part this 
is because doing so requires specifying boundary conditions at both individual and structural 
levels for entrepreneurial opportunities and, indeed, entrepreneurship. A key issue is under-
standing the complex interplay between endogenous (internal to the person) and exogenous 
(external to the person) factors in explaining entrepreneurial behaviours and practice. Such 
understanding is particularly important in overcoming a prevailing discourse that en-
trepreneurial opportunities are necessarily only available to a few people, rather than all so-
cial groups. At stake is the dispositional nature of entrepreneurial practice, whereby real free-
doms and possibilities exist and have real effects on the abilities of those involved to choose 
and act. Nowhere is this concern with freedoms and possibilities in the context of welfare 
economics more evident and indeed, better theorised, than in the Capabilities Approach, con-
ceived in the 1980s by Amartya Sen (and subsequently in collaboration with Martha Nuss-
baum). Our objective in this paper is to offer a new perspective on entrepreneurship theory 
that draws directly upon the Capabilities Approach to explore the freedoms individuals have 
to pursue and develop entrepreneurial opportunities.  
The Capabilities Approach 
The Capabilities Appoach (CA), or Human Development Approach (HDA) (Deneulin and 
Shahani, 2009; Nussbaum, 2000, 2011; Nussbaum and Sen, 1993; Sen, 1989, 1992, 1993, 
1998, 1999) explores the well-being of individuals not through what they already have, but 
the possibilities for choosing to do or be other than what they are. Nussbaum’s (2011) theory 
of development emphasises the importance of individual differences in the ability to trans-
form resources into valuable activities (see also Hicks, 1997). As such, it has a concern for 
the distribution of freedoms within society. Its focus then, is on the nature of freedom per se. 
 The CA develops an explicit interest in the individual’s freedom to choose and act 
whilst attempting to answer the question ‘what is this person able to do and be?’ (Nussbaum, 
2011, p.20). The central premise of the CA is that although individuals have the potential or 
capacity ‘to do and be’ many things, they do not always have the freedom to follow these 
things through, should they wish to. Indeed, very different kinds of opportunities are accessi-
ble to people living under different regimes, countries and cultures. In more recent iterations 
of the CA, Nussbaum has put forward a list of ten ‘central capabilities’ that are deemed uni-
versally important for human dignity. These include such fundamental capabilities as ‘life’, 
‘bodily health’, and ‘sense, imagination and thought’, as well as more socially oriented capa-
bilities such as ‘play’ or ‘control over one’s environment’ (the full list of Central Capabilities 
is life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination, and thought; emotions; practical 
reason; affiliation; other species; play; control over one’s environment (A) political, and (B) 
material - see Nussbaum, 2011, pp. 33-34). Nussbaum argues these capabilities are normative 
and should not be considered unchanging, or of being closed to revision given greater cultural 
understanding. Sayer (2011) holds that the CA challenges us to take a position on where we 
stand in terms of human values. He argues the power of the approach is not its contribution to 
abstract philosophical debates about human rights and freedom, rather it is its challenge to 
consider what these freedoms might be in particular contexts. 
!2
Introducing entrepreneurial capability 
The majority of academic papers adopting the term ‘entrepreneurial capability’ are written at 
the level of the firm, and build on literature predominantly in the context of strategic man-
agement and the resource based view (RBV) of the firm. For example, we find it in the con-
text of strategic management (Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001; Robeyns, 2005; Sirmon et al., 
2007); competitive advantage and intrapreneurship (Zahra et al., 2011); dynamic capabilities 
(Teece, 2009; Wu, 2007; Harris et al., 2013); and international entrepreneurship (Karra et al., 
2008; Zhang et al., 2009).  
Capabilities for these theories are generally defined in terms of resources: “resources 
are stocks of available factors that are owned or controlled by the organisation, and capabili-
ties are an organization’s capacity to deploy resources” (Makadok, 2001, p. 35; see also Amit 
and Schoemaker, 1993).  Makadok (2001, p. 389) defines capabilities as “a special type of 
resource, specifically an organisationally embedded non-transferable firm-specific resource 
whose purpose is to improve the productivity of the other resources possessed by the firm.” 
Essentially, it is the bundling of the resources that builds capabilities (Sirmon et al., 2007). 
The emphasis in entrepreneurship theory is upon developing productivity, profitability and 
competitive advantage (reflecting the literature on the RBV). However, there is also an allied 
tradition that treats the capability more as an internal resource of the individual. Examples 
can be found in respect of the psychology of the entrepreneur (Busenitz and Arthurs, 2007); 
entrepreneurial learning (Rae and Carswell, 2001); entrepreneurial perceptions (Kor et al., 
2007) and entrepreneurial self-efficacy (Chen et al., 1998).  
For entrepreneurial capability to be understood within the framework of the CA it 
would need to focus on the freedoms individuals have to pursue entrepreneurship. This re-
quires an understanding of the conditions that must, as a minimum, be in place in order for 
entrepreneurship to be possible. For the CA approach, these conditions would serve as a 
framework for exploring the relative health of a society (and economy) in terms of the free-
dom it can offer individuals. Within the context of entrepreneurship, the entrepreneurial ca-
pability can be defined as the freedom of an individual to pursue and develop an en-
trepreneurial opportunity within their environment. Over and above the contextual factors 
involved, this freedom is always dependent upon a distinctive set of other freedoms (other 
capabilities) that result from the interaction of structure and agency. The next section of the 
paper prepares the ground for a conceptual understanding of what these freedoms might be 
and provides direction on what type of favourable situations are designated by the ‘en-
trepreneurial opportunity’. 
Pursuing and developing entrepreneurial opportunities 
Despite the considerable attention received, the existence and importance of entrepreneurial 
opportunities remains a matter of debate, with theorists continuing to take quite divergent 
views. Their contrasting positions have been traced back to Kirzner (1973) and also to 
Schumpeter (1934), designated as the ‘weak and strong premises of entrepreneurship’ respec-
tively (Sarasvathy, 2008). Entrepreneurship theorists have drawn a clear-cut distinction be-
tween a ‘discovery’ perspective on the one hand, which emphasises the objective nature of 
opportunities (see Mole and Mole, 2010; Shane and Venkataraman, 2000), and a ‘creation’ 
perspective on the other hand, which suggests opportunities are subjective in nature and 
brought into existence through the actions and sense-making of entrepreneurial actors (see 
Buchanan and Vanberg, 1991; Chiles et al., 2007; Dimov, 2007; Gartner, 1985; Sarason et al., 
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2006, 2010; Sarasvathy, 2001; Sarasvathy et al., 2003; Venkataraman et al., 2012); critically, 
these positions are held to be contradictory (Alvarez and Barney, 2007; McMullan and Shep-
herd, 2006).  
Helpfully, the CA enables a distinctively different approach to understanding oppor-
tunity by focusing on the substantive freedoms people have to do and act. This brings atten-
tion towards specifying the conditions for such freedoms rather than on a debate over when 
and how opportunities might exist. Leaving aside the particular focus on entrepreneurship in 
this paper, it is helpful to consider the nature of ‘opportunities’ in general in order to demon-
strate why an opportunity is not merely a possibility by another name. Opportunities must be 
considered socially constructed, as to talk of opportunities outside of the social realm would 
be meaningless (Fletcher, 2006). This is because it is difficult to describe situations as an op-
portunity without reference to a motive, intent or a perceived goal. Opportunities exist pre-
cisely because they are for someone, and by extension, for something. The consequence of 
this is that an opportunity and a possibility cannot be considered synonymous. An apple fall-
ing off a tree only becomes an opportunity if someone wishes to eat it. Opportunities may be 
constituted by possibilities but must involve more than this: they are an interaction between 
structural possibilities and agential action. More specifically, opportunities are always partic-
ular combinations of possibilities that need specifying. For example, even if it is theoretically 
possible for the majority of people to attend university, the opportunity only exists for some, 
due in part to restricted supply. It follows that the right kinds of possibility must exist and in-
teract for someone to have a particular opportunity. Subsequently, opportunities (in general) 
require a combination of possibilities to come together, through chance, through individual 
action, and through the actions of others, into a favourable situation. It is here that the CA can 
be useful in theorising the freedoms required for an individual to pursue and develop en-
trepreneurial opportunities.  
Entrepreneurial capability as a higher order combined capability 
In the CA, it is the interaction of structure and agency that is important to the formation of 
capabilities. Nussbaum refers to these as ‘combined capabilities’. In effect, these are the “to-
tality of the opportunities [one] has for choice and action in [one’s] specific, political, social, 
and economic situation.” (Nussbaum 2011, p. 21.) Combined capabilities are distinguished 
from ‘internal capabilities’ that are fluid and dynamic states of the person. In Western soci-
eties a normative but key role of society is to support and develop the internal capabilities of 
its citizens through “education, resources to enhance physical and emotional health, support 
for family care and love” etc. (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 21). Crucially, the CA argues that whilst 
any given society might actually be quite good at developing internal capabilities, it may not 
provide the opportunity to turn capabilities into ‘functionings’ (or the opportunity to use a 
capability). For example, many societies educate people to a level where they are more than 
capable of free speech on a wide range of issues (internally), but government censorship acts 
to deny free speech in practice.  
Equally, it may be that, on the one hand, a society fosters the kind of entrepreneurial 
training that promotes entrepreneurial behaviours (risk taking, networking, effectual decision 
making, resource leverage etc.), but ultimately this will prove fruitless if its economic envi-
ronment is characterised by, for example, high barriers to entry, racism, sexism, disadvantage 
and a regulatory regime that prevents individuals from developing new ventures. The CA, 
therefore stresses that ‘combined capabilities’ are defined in terms of “internal capabilities 
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plus the social/political/economic conditions in which functioning can actually be 
chosen” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 22). Any society producing combined capabilities, will neces-
sarily also be producing internal capabilities. Hence, the freedom to pursue entrepreneurship 
must also involve the development of internal capabilities and the opportunity to perform 
them. The existence of entrepreneurial capability can then be understood as a higher order 
combined capability, i.e. a combined capability that is, in turn, dependent upon a range of 
other capabilities, both combined and internal. If the necessary conditions for pursuing an 
entrepreneurial opportunity are to be understood then our next task must be to theorise which 
combined and internal capabilities are specific to the existence of the entrepreneurial capabil-
ity?   
Entrepreneurial capability: Introducing 7 conditions 
Entrepreneurship theory actually provides clear direction as to what the conditions necessary 
for the freedom to practice entrepreneurship might be (see Eckhardt and Shane, 2003; Shane, 
2012; Shane and Venkataraman, 2000; Venkataraman, 1997; Autio et al., 2014). For example, 
existing definitions of entrepreneurial opportunities, with their roots in economic theory, con-
tain implicit boundary conditions that relate to the anticipated outcomes of entrepreneurship, 
i.e. new products, services, new means, ends, means-ends relationships, access to markets 
etc. (see Casson, 1982; Corbett, 2007; Dimov, 2011). Analytically, these can now be divided 
into either combined capabilities (those emphasising exogenous conditions), including mar-
ket circumstances, resource access and re-combination, technological advances, political 
changes, population changes and external innovation within their definitions, or internal ca-
pabilities (those emphasising endogenous conditions), including prior knowledge, creativity, 
risk-taking, motivation and/or intention, self efficacy, sense-making, and propensity for ac-
tion.   
Three necessary combined capabilities 
What follows is an initial attempt to identify which capabilities (combined and internal) are 
necessary for the existence of entrepreneurial capability i.e. the freedom to pursue and devel-
op an entrepreneurial opportunity in one’s environment. Taking economic theory as espoused 
in Western capitalist economies as our starting point (albeit recognising that other vantage 
points might provide helpful alternative theoretical perspectives in the future), we begin by 
positing the existence of three combined capabilities: 
1.The possibility of recombining resources (requiring both access and organisation).  
2.The possibility of transactional (market) exchange.  
3.The possibility of appropriating profits or value. 
In abstraction, where any one of these conditions is not extant for a particular individ-
ual there cannot be the freedom to take entrepreneurial action through developing a perceived 
opportunity. One might have an idea for a potentially novel product but if there is no possibil-
ity of either accessing or combining the required resources, or exchanging the product via 
some kind of transaction (usually via the market) and appropriating the profits in the process, 
then this will remain just a possibility, not a freedom to pursue entrepreneurship. Taking each 
in turn it is possible to sketch out why each combined capability is essential for the freedom 
to pursue entrepreneurship.  
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First, the possibility for recombining resources encompasses the many types of re-
sources necessary to develop an opportunity and recognises the need for both access to these 
and the need to combine them – which are dependent upon the individual’s structural rela-
tions, position in society etc. This possibility is not automatic for all citizens. Some, through 
no fault of their own, will lack access to finance, some will lack the ability to recruit or de-
velop appropriate knowledge, some suppliers will not offer favourable terms to a market 
newcomer, and regulation may prevent a market being accessed by new individuals or organ-
isations (e.g. forming a new bank in the financial sector). Clearly, being in a position to ac-
cess and recombine resources is built upon other possibilities and freedoms to take action 
(including the endogenous conditions associated with the entrepreneurial project that we will 
discuss shortly), however, it is the structural ability to recombine resources that is unique to 
entrepreneurship and makes this a necessary possibility for the freedom to pursue it. So, and 
to take only one example, market regulation, or a lack of it, does not in itself necessarily pre-
vent the freedom to pursue entrepreneurship but lacking the ability to recombine resources 
will do.  
Second, the possibility of transactional (market) exchange, following the development 
of a new idea or venture, is also an essential freedom for entrepreneurship. Buying goods is a 
necessary possibility to access and recombine resources of course, and so this possibility, in 
part, also constitutes the first condition. However, it is also a separate and unique possibility 
essential to entrepreneurship when it comes to selling the combined resources. Whether that 
be a product, service or process, an entrepreneur is required to seek revenue from their re-
sources through transactional exchange of some kind. Given the possibility of transactional 
exchange for newly introduced goods and services is not necessarily available to all this is a 
second necessary possibility that makes up the freedom to pursue entrepreneurship. Some 
markets require access to appropriate social capital for successful exchange to occur, for ex-
ample, defence contracts can require access to senior military officials. High barriers to entry, 
regulation and competitors can actively prevent new comers from entering a market and trade 
law can prevent the selling of goods across international borders. Without the possibility to 
sell newly introduced goods (within a particular context) there can be no freedom to pursue 
entrepreneurship.  
It is important to stress that in making this argument we are not overlooking the impor-
tance of other possibilities and freedoms necessary for the existence of a market per se (e.g. 
trust and private property enshrined in law), rather we highlight the centrality of the possibili-
ty of exchange for any individual pursuing entrepreneurship. Furthermore, by bracketing 
(market) in our list of central possibilities we are indicating that the normal context for such 
transactional exchange is indeed the market. We acknowledge that the possibility of pursuing 
entrepreneurial opportunity on the fringes of a market (or even beyond it altogether (see Val-
liere and Gegenhuber, 2014)) challenges this specific boundary condition on one level. Nev-
ertheless, the transactional exchange involved in ‘selling’ remains central. 
Third is the possibility of appropriating profits or value. This is also comprised of many 
other possibilities but it serves as another defining feature of the freedom to act entrepre-
neurially. In monetary terms an entrepreneur must make a profit from their recombination 
activities. However, some individuals will be more able to make profits than others. Take, for 
example, the idea for an online-only supermarket that uses low price, rather than quality, as 
its unique selling point. For low prices to be achieved the ‘online’ costs would need to be sig-
nificantly lower than traditional retail costs and it would need favourable terms from suppli-
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ers of groceries that are normally reserved for organisations that bulk order. Given online 
costs have been demonstrated to be lower than traditional retail in other sectors, the need to 
gain low ‘bulk-order prices’ would be essential for a profit to be made in this example. Those 
with access to large amounts of finance may have the possibility to bulk purchase, those 
without will not. Without bulk ordering there could be no profits and the freedom to pursue 
this particular entrepreneurial opportunity would not be present. Whilst in this example, ac-
cess to finance determines whether profits are available, this is not always the case. It is how-
ever the case that the freedom to pursue entrepreneurship always requires the possibility of 
making a profit (whether or not that materialises). The inclusion of ‘value’ in our definition 
recognises that profit is not the only form of return entrepreneurs may wish to appropriate 
(e.g. social value). 
These three combined capabilities are proposed as the minimum exogenous conditions 
to begin the process of theory development whilst drawing on the CA. There could be more 
conditions but moving beyond these abstract conditions requires exploration within specific 
contexts. Some communities will need more basic conditions to be met before they can be 
considered as having freedom (such as education, health, political freedom). The novelty of 
these three conditions is that they can work as a unifying theory for understanding entrepre-
neurship in different contexts (e.g. Western capitalism and developing economies) as in all 
capitalist economies, regardless of context, the proposition is that these are necessary for the 
freedom to pursue entrepreneurship.  
4 necessary internal capabilities 
The three combined capabilities just discussed are not sufficient on their own for the freedom 
to pursue entrepreneurship to exist. The CA also requires a set of internal capabilities to be 
specified. Here, realist social theory and Archer’s (2003) ideas on agential projects can guide 
understanding of the mediating role human agency plays in social transformation (e.g. Mole 
and Mole 2010). To set out what the minimum internal conditions might be, Archer’s concept 
of the ‘agential project’ can be used to identify the internal capabilities necessary for reflexive 
action and social transformation. Archer (2003: 6) outlines the agential project as “an end that 
is desired, however tentatively or nebulously, and also some notion, however imprecise, of 
the course of action through which to accomplish it.” The agential project is in a constant 
state of change, being reproduced and/or transformed through the actions of those involved. 
In its early stages it may well comprise an end (or ends) that remain loosely articulated, as 
tacit rather than explicit knowledge (Nonaka and Takeushi, 1995). This is consistent with the 
logic of effectuation, which draws attention to this nature of unfolding and ‘unspecified ends’ 
(see Sarasvathy, 2001). As the project develops it can take on an explicit form, it is codified 
(e.g. in the form of a business plan or strategy), and can assume ‘a life of its own’. For Archer 
(2003) the conditions necessary for the pursuit of any agential project will always entail min-
imally three internal capabilities: reflexivity, intentionality and performativity. To the extent 
that entrepreneurship gives rise to innovative new products and services that are both novel 
and valuable, and which result from the recombination of resources, an entrepreneurial 
project must also be dependent upon human creativity (Ward, 2004; Martin and Wilson 
2014). Drawing on Archer’s logic and this recognition of the role of creativity means that the 
freedom to pursue entrepreneurship requires the following internal capabilities to be present: 
1. Entrepreneurial reflexivity 
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2. Entrepreneurial performance. 
3. Entrepreneurial creativity 
4. Entrepreneurial intent. 
The human capacity for reflexivity underpins the strategic decision-making process and 
is dependent upon prior knowledge, particularly in the context of entrepreneurship. Without 
reflexivity, the entrepreneur would not ‘spot’ or ‘develop’ any opportunity. Archer’s (2003, p. 
161; 2007, p. 91) conceptualisation of reflexivity as a personal emergent property offers en-
trepreneurship scholars a theoretical understanding of the types of mental activities involved. 
Entrepreneurial subjects converse with themselves through planning, rehearsing, mulling 
over, deciding, re-living, prioritising, imagining, clarifying, establishing imaginary conversa-
tions and budgeting (Caetano 2014, p.9). These offer the potential for research that explores 
which is most salient in which contexts of the entrepreneurial project. Some clues might be 
found in Archer’s further distinction between four modes of reflexivity: communicative, au-
tonomous, meta and fractured (Caetano 2014, p.3). Whilst communicative reflexivity requires 
confirmation from others, for example, autonomous reflexivity is defined in terms of self-
contained inner dialogues that lead directly to action without the need for validation by other 
individuals. Tempting though it might be to link this mode with that of the autonomous en-
trepreneur, such a list (in keeping with the spirit of the CA) indicates the variety of personal 
responses that might be necessary in any given context of entrepreneurship. Furthermore, 
whilst reflexivity is a necessary and universal condition for any action, the specific types of 
reflexivity (e.g. planning skills, financial know-how, management strategy, social skills) can 
only be identified with reference to a particular case of entrepreneurship, within a particular 
context (Cox, 2014). 
The second necessary condition recognises there can be no entrepreneurship without 
action. Entrepreneurship involves doing and performance is essential to the freedom to pur-
sue entrepreneurship. Clearly, the type of performance required will vary from context to 
context, as the cultural, structural and economic conditions of a region vary, so will the type 
of action required. The CA directs attention to specify what these action capabilities might be 
within a particular industry or region and to measure how much of the population can be real-
istically expected to develop these capabilities. The third condition generally agreed upon 
within existing theory is creativity, which appears to be a distinctive condition of entrepre-
neurship given the focus on novelty and value (see Manimala, 2009; Sternberg and Lubart, 
1999). In order for social possibilities to be combined into something novel and economically 
valuable, a venture idea must be formed. Human creativity can therefore be argued to be a 
necessary capability for the freedom to pursue entrepreneurship. Here again there is a need to 
recognise the overlap with other internal capabilities. For example, ’imagining’ is a type of 
mental activity associated with reflexivity, is regarded as an ingredient for creativity and is 
also a ‘central capability’ on Nussbaum’s (2011) list. Imagination though can be put to many 
uses, such as reflexive (as detailed above) and playful. Whilst creativity also requires imagi-
nation, it is only one of the components that make up this capability. Our choice to include 
creativity as a specific internal capability necessary for the freedom to pursue entrepreneur-
ship is in respect of creativity’s association with both novelty and value, which must be 
recognised before and after the entrepreneurial event (see Stokes et al., pp. 34-35). 
The final necessary internal capability recognises that intent is a part of any freedom to 
pursue entrepreneurship. Understanding how a passion or drive to pursue or develop an op-
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portunity is fostered or hindered is already an important object of investigation (Barron 2008; 
Cardon et al., 2012). However, the CA directs us to ask questions of which individuals decide 
not to take entrepreneurial action and why that might be (e.g. they lack self-efficacy, have a 
sense of fatalism, or have an inability to take risks due to financial constraints, and so on). 
Importantly, because the CA recognises the difference between an internal capability and its 
functioning it suggests that many can have an abstract intention to pursue entrepreneurship 
but then will not do so. The conditions that prevent this abstract intention becoming some-
thing that brings about entrepreneurial action or, in the terms of the CA, turns into a ‘fertile 
functioning’ are not fully explicated within existing theory. This is a crucial omission. A lack 
of intention can often be considered synonymous with not valuing or wishing to pursue en-
trepreneurship but for disadvantaged groups a lack of intention can represent a realistic re-
sponse to structural barriers. The inclusion of this internal capability in our list recognises 
there is a crucial difference between someone having the freedom to pursue entrepreneurship 
and choosing not to and someone who lacks the freedom to pursue entrepreneurship and 
therefore does not consider it a viable intention. Recognising intent as a necessary condition 
for the freedom to pursue entrepreneurship can direct attention to these important differences.  
When in place, the seven combined and internal capabilities outlined here make up the 
capability for entrepreneurship, and therefore form an initial sketch of the boundary condi-
tions for the freedom to pursue and develop an entrepreneurial opportunity. Whilst this con-
ception of entrepreneurial capability can be applied to understand those we already label as 
‘entrepreneurs’, its strength is that it offers a framework with which to investigate those who 
are not entrepreneurs and ask whether they have the freedom to become one. Unifying such 
research under the umbrella of human capability assessment, enables the exploration of how 
it is possible to identify both the readiness of individuals within a region to pursue entrepre-
neurship and a route to gain evidence for policy makers on how to support social inclusion 
(e.g. through widening access to the educational and learning experiences that enable these 
seven capabilities to develop and be performed). Subsequently, using the CA to explore the 
freedom to pursue entrepreneurship can help merge the interests of human development and 
entrepreneurship theory and policy.  
Discussion 
In their work on capabilities and the human development approach, Sen (1993) and Nuss-
baum (2011) remind us that the freedoms we have can be restricted by accident of birth. Sub-
sequently, the interpretation of CA theory presented here attempts to link economic and hu-
man development theory through suggesting entrepreneurship theory should not only be con-
cerned with the interests of practicing entrepreneurs but must also take into account the en-
trepreneurial freedoms afforded to each individual, whoever they are, and wherever they live. 
It is therefore a deeply humanist theoretical framework. Affording greater theoretical atten-
tion to the entrepreneurial capability (a combined capability as defined through the CA) can 
also enhance the ability of policy makers to consider the humanist aims of enabling equality 
of opportunity at the same time as focusing on economic aims, as both can be achieved 
through identifying just how much freedom there is to pursue entrepreneurship. 
Of course the linking of entrepreneurship and the CA is not an uncontentious project to 
undertake. Some might wish to challenge the appropriateness of putting entrepreneurship on 
the same footing as the right to life, bodily health, our senses, imagination, thought, emotions 
and so on. But then Nussbaum’s normative list does already include quite different types of 
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capability (including political and material control, practical reason, affiliation and play). As 
she is keen to point out, “The irreducible heterogeneity of the Central Capabilities is extreme-
ly important. A nation cannot satisfy the need for one capability by giving people a large 
amount of another” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 35). Understandably, critical entrepreneurship theo-
rists might also want to challenge the implication that entrepreneurship is a positive human 
endeavour (see Jones and Spicer, 2009). On this point, we argue that in a society where the 
opportunity for (large) financial rewards are afforded to those who start successful business-
es, a barrier to human development exists if a particular group or social class has differential 
access to such pursuits; this is regardless of any wider debates over the fairness of the distrib-
ution of such rewards. The little research that has been conducted into entrepreneurship and 
the Human Development Approach suggests that societal well-being can improve as a larger 
percentage of people gain access to and are able to exploit such opportunities (Gries and 
Naudé, 2011). Whatever the case in practice, the focus of this work is on developing a 
framework to understand the barriers to a person’s freedom to choose this pursuit in the first 
place.  
Through applying the CA to the domain of entrepreneurship this paper has made three 
specific conceptual contributions. First, the conception of the entrepreneurial capability as the 
freedom to choose to pursue and develop entrepreneurial opportunities is proposed. Second, 
the principle that the freedom to pursue and develop entrepreneurial opportunities is depen-
dent upon a set of both combined and internal conditions necessary for the pursuit or devel-
opment of any such opportunity was highlighted and seven conditions necessary for the exis-
tence of this freedom have been identified. Third, together these insights provide a new 
framework for empirically exploring these freedoms as well the ability to undertake assess-
ments of the readiness of any individual (and by extension, groups, or organisations) to de-
velop their entrepreneurial capabilities. Such research would steer debate away from how or 
whether entrepreneurial opportunities are discovered or created (e.g. Martin and Wilson 
2014) and into the more vital arena of whether someone is free to pursue entrepreneurial op-
portunities in the first place. 
We propose that only in those cases where the seven conditions outlined have been met 
can we reasonably infer there to be the freedom to act entrepreneurially. Importantly, this 
claim is open to simple empirical testing: every example of an exploited opportunity should 
have met these seven conditions. When considering the impact of such research for the do-
main of entrepreneurship it is essential to highlight one of its key strengths: it takes every in-
dividual seriously, espousing a principle of “each person as an end” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 35). 
Nussbaum notes the failure of some human development policy initiatives to cater adequately 
for the interests of all human beings, rather than a particular group. A policy that encourages 
the development of human capabilities in some individuals at the expense of others is what 
she calls a ‘tragic choice’ i.e. “the violation of an entitlement grounded in basic justice” re-
sulting in “a cost of a distinctive sort, one that in a fully just society no person has to 
bear” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 37). Such a cost is further characterised as a ‘corrosive disadvan-
tage’ for those involved. We would argue that this is a discourse that could have a major im-
pact is if it is applied to the arena of entrepreneurship and entrepreneurship education. One 
place this could start is in the context of the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) project 
(GEM, 2014).      
Two specific areas that underpin the GEM study serve as examples of how the concep-
tion of the entrepreneurial capability outlined in this paper might encourage a fresh look at 
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some fundamental assumptions. First, the distinction currently made between so-called ‘ne-
cessity’ and ‘opportunity’ entrepreneurship (see Reynolds et al., 2002; Sternberg et al., 2006; 
Valliere and Peterson, 2009) concerns an assessment of the motivation of the entrepreneur to 
start a venture, and the distinction between “entrepreneurship reflecting the voluntary pursuit 
of opportunity and that reflecting a necessity to engage in entrepreneurship when there is an 
absence of employment opportunities” (Reynolds et. al., 2002). Opportunity entrepreneurs 
are viewed as those who start a business in order to pursue an opportunity, whilst necessity 
entrepreneurship is more requirement-based (Reynolds et. al., 2005), with those involved 
starting a business because it was ‘the best option available’ (Reynolds et al., 2002). Not-
withstanding the observation that the two approaches might not, in fact, be mutually exclu-
sive (e.g. Mandelman and Montes-Rojas, 2009), entrepreneurial capabilities, as defined 
through the CA, widens attention through exploring the determinants of the freedom to pur-
sue entrepreneurship as they apply to people across the world, in developing and developed 
countries alike: through assessing their relative possibilities to act (or otherwise - e.g. Verrest, 
2013). 
The second area the CA account of entrepreneurial capabilities has the potential to im-
pact is the discussion of the Entrepreneurial Framework Conditions (EFC), used to underpin 
GEM’s National Expert Survey (NES). The NES measures key Entrepreneurial Framework 
Conditions, including finance, government policies, entrepreneurial education and training 
(the 9 EFCs are Finance; Government Policies; Government programs; Entrepreneurial edu-
cation and training; R&D transfer; Commercial and professional infrastructure; Internal mar-
ket openness; Physical infrastructure and services; Cultural and social norms). These EFCs 
are seen to operate as key antecedent conditions impacting upon the pursuit of entrepreneurial 
opportunities in any given country (a model linking EFCs to the entrepreneurial opportunity 
can be found in Acs et al., 2004, p. 14; see also Reynolds et al. 1999, 2005; and Block & 
Wagner, 2006). This work suggests that the seven conditions of ‘entrepreneurial capability’ 
might be fruitfully added to these, framed around this idea of ‘freedom of choice’. 
In conclusion we would like to draw attention to the differences between what is theo-
retically and practically possible. The seven conditions identified are, in theory, available for 
all to experience and yet the freedom to pursue entrepreneurship is, in practice, unachievable 
for so many. Current economic policy, in the Western world, dictates that the freedom to re-
combine resources, (especially financial resources) to carry out transactional (market) ex-
change and then appropriate profits or value is not widespread. By drawing attention to the 
lack of theoretical necessity in such practice there is an increased chance of making progress. 
To the extent that entrepreneurship and human development theory can be joined up, the ob-
jective need not be to suggest everyone should become entrepreneurs, rather theory should 
understand when they have a real choice. As Nussbaum notes “the goal is always to present 
people with choices in the areas the list identifies as central, rather than to dragoon them into 
a specific mode of functioning.” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 97). We would argue that this proposed 
field of entrepreneurship capabilities research has the potential to make genuine social inclu-
sion a non-contradictory goal of entrepreneurship research. 
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